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INTRODUCTION 
The last Reagan appointee to the United States Supreme 
Court was Anthony M. Kennedy. Formerly a judge of the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy was appointed by 
President Ford. He was also a member of a special California 
commission appointed by Governor Reagan to draft Proposition 
1 to reduce state spending. Justice Kennedy has strong ties 
with the Republican party, but conservatives as well as 
liberals had questions as to what Kennedy would actually do 
once on the Supreme Court. Charles F. Williams writing for 
the ABA Journal suggested that the Senate was pleased with 
Kennedy because he was not the ideologue that Bork was. 1 
Kennedy"s lack of identifiable ideology was one of the main 
factors that got him appointed to the Court. First, it 
allowed the Senate Judiciary Committee to come to a 
compromise. 2 Second, it would allow the Senators to explain 
why they had voted for him in the event that he might decide 
cases unfavorably. The senators could say, "'Hey, I didn"t 
know that he was going to vote that way. " .. 3 They wanted a 
justice who appeared middle-of-the-road, and numerous 
articles were written prior to his confirmation discussing 
Kennedy"s middle of the road attitudes. Now that Kennedy has 
1 Williams, The Opinions of Anthony Kennedy 
No Time for Ideology, 74 A.B.A.,J. 56 (1988). 
2 lb1d. 
3 lb1d. 
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been on the Court for more than one term, it is possible to 
asses wether he is a middle-of-the-road Justice. Kennedy is 
not a middle-of-the-road judge. Kennedy is very much a 
conservative Justice who sees the Constitution as a document 
of principles to be strictly adhered to, and who sees the 
role.of a judge as a non-activist. These conclusions were 
drawn after reading his majority opinions, his concurring 
opinions, and his dissenting opinions for the 1988 and 1989 
Court Terms. Some of his more important appellate decisions 
were mentioned by authorities in articles written after his 
nomination to the Court. Those decisions will also be 
analyzed in this paper. . There are over 400 opinions 
authored by Kennedy since his appointment to the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court; 
therefore, only a small number of them will be analyzed for 
this paper. 
The paper is divided into two parts. The first part is 
devoted to statutory interpretation. In this section, I will 
analyze cases questioning the validity or application of 
statutes or regulations. The second section centers on 
constitutional interpretation. Within this section, I will 
explain how Kennedy sees the role of the judge. In addition, 
will analyze some cases involving issues of constitutional 
interpretation. Finally, I will analyze some of the pre­
confirmation articles that speculated about his behavior on 
the Court. 
I 
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
INTRODUCTION 
There are maxims of self restraint governing 
constitutional as well as statutory interpretation. Five 
such maxims will be discussed and applied to Kennedy"s 
interpretation of statutory questions" 
First, many of the cases or controversies that reach 
the Supreme Court are decided on statutory grounds rather 
than constitutional grounds. This is a maxim of self 
restraint. 4 " (I)f a case or controversy can be decided on 
any other (grounds) than constitutional grounds-- such as 
statutory construction, which constitutes the greatest 
single area of the Court"s work, ... --the Court will be eager 
to do so. " 5 
Another maxim was articulated in an article written by 
Louis Fisher. 6 "A more reliable safeguard against judicial 
activism is the Court"s ability to sidestep sensitive issues 
or decide in such a way as to allow the other branches and 
state governments to re-enter the field and make the 
necessary adjustments and revisions to the court 
doctrine." 7 
4 Henry J. Abraham, ed., The Judicial Process (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 386. 
5 lllld. 
6 Fisher. Methods of Constitutional Interpretation: 
The Limits of Original Intent. 18 CUMB. L. REV. 
67 (1987/1988). 
7 lllld. 
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In addition to these maxims there are others that also 
deal with statutory interpretation. "If the court does find 
that it must hold a law unconstitutional, it will usually 
try hard to confine the holding to that particular section 
of the statute which was successfully challenged." 8 "In 
any event, the Court will not normally formulate a rule of 
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise 
facts to which it is applied." 9 
Another maxim is, "In the event of a val idi ty 
challenged statute, the presumption of its constitutionality 
is always in its favor." 10 In other words, the piece of 
legislation will always be considered constitutional unless 
the challenging party can prove otherwise. 
Finally, Justices who read the exact wording of a 
statute are exhibiting another form of judicial self 
restraint. They use a rule called the "plain meaning". The 
answer' to the case or controversy can most often be found in 
the plain meaning of the statute without necessarily looking 
at legislative intent. 
"Where its words are plain, clear and determinate, 
they require no interpretation .... Where the words 
admit of two senses, each of which is conformable 
to general usage, that sense is to. adopted, which 
without departing from the literal import of the 
words, best harlllOnizes with the nature and 
objectives, the scope and design of the 
instrument.' 11 
8 Abraham, Tbe Judicial Process, p. 389. 
9 .l.b.iJi., p. 386. 
10 .l.b.iJi., p. 385. 
11 Sheldon Goldman, and Austin Sarat, eds., American 
Court Systems' Readings in Judicial Procedure and 
Behavior (White Plains, New York: Longman Inc., 
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Justice Kennedy most definitely uses the plain meaning rule 
along with other maxims of self-restraint. Two opinions, 
though, clearly exemplify the plain meaning reasoning. They 
are K-Mart v. Cartier, 108 S.Ct. 1811 (1988), and Patterson 
v. McLean, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989). 
Decisions 
In K-Mart v. Cartier the Court had to determine the 
validity of Customs Service Regulation 19 CFR sections 
133.21(c)(1)-(3). This section of a 1987 regulation outlined 
instances when section 526 of the 1930 Tariff Act were not 
applicable. Kennedy reasoned that sections (c) (1),(2) did 
not violate section 536 of the Tariff Act because it 
resolved statutory ambiguity in such words as "owned by" and 
"merchandise of foreign manufacture". 12 It is apparent from 
the opinion that if a subsection of a later or different act 
clarifies the original act, and it does not directly change 
the plain meaning of the act, it is not overruled. In this 
case, however, a section of the Customs Service Regulation 
was found contradictory to the original section of the 
Tariff Act. 19 CFR section 133.21 (c)(3) directly 
contradicted "gray market strategies" prohibited by the 
Tariff Act and it was held violative of the Tariff Act. 
Here, the holding of only a particular section of a statute 
1989), p. 587. 
12 108 S.Ct. at 1811. 
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in violation of the original act regulating that area of 
commerce represents a maxim of self-restraint. 
An article in the Los Angeles Daily Journal examined 
Kennedy's opinion in K-Mart y. Cartier. The author correctly 
pointed out that Kennedy used a doctrine, ..... that the 
plain meaning of a statute or regulation governs, virtually 
regardless of legislative purpose and practical impact," 13 
In Patterson v. McLean Kennedy avoided a potential 
constitutional question involving racial discrimination in 
the dismissing of employees by looking only to the very 
specific section brought to the attention of the court by 
the parties. The parties to the case raised the question 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1981. The petitioner, a black 
woman, ctaimed that she was not promoted to accountant clerk 
solely because of her race. She brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 
section 1981. The Court in Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S.Ct. 2586 
(1976), previously held that in the making of contracts race 
could not be a factor under 42 U.S.C. section 1981. Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the Court's majority, reasoned that in 
Patterson y. McLean the continuing of contracts should have 
been brought up under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and not section 1981 because the code deals only with the 
making of contracts, not the continuing or breaking of 
contracts. This opinion is an example of the plain meaning 
13 Louis B. Schwartz, "Kennedy: The Newest Justice Stakes 
Out His Position: The 'Gray Market' Case 'Plain 
Meaning' And Other Potents," r,os Ange 1es Da i 1y 
Journal, 30 Sept 1988, p. 3. 
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rule and of the maxim confining statutory questions to the 
precise issues presented. 
In other cases Kennedy also reached questions of 
statutory interpretation. Bethesda Hosp. Ass"n v. Bowen, 108 
S.Ct. 1255 (1988), was the first opinion written by Kennedy 
for the Court. This case dealt with the authority of a 
review board to hear a case concerning a 1979 Medicare 
regulation disallowing certain claims for malpractice 
insurance premium costs. Kennedy held that the plain 
language of the statute states that the review board had the 
authority to hear claims against regulations. 14 Kennedy in 
this case preferred to let the review board decide the issue 
in keeping with the second maxim of self-restraint, which is 
to allow other branches of the government to decide the 
issue or to make necessary changes. 
In the same article in the Los Angeles Dailv Journal 
the author questioned the validity of answering questions 
solely on the plain language of the statute or regulation 
because in Bethesda no substantive or practical significance 
of the controversy was discussed. 15 The issue was far too 
technical an issue according to the author. This path taken 
by Kennedy was extremely self-restraintist in nature. 
Because he does not see himself or the role of judge in 
general as appropriately being activist, a narrow statutory 
issue was decided. 
14 108 S.Ct. at 1257.
 
15 Fisher, "Methods of Constitutional Interpretation," p. 4.
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Occasionally Kennedy will look to legislative history 
to help resolve any question not readily resolvable by the 
language of the statute alone. There are two such cases. In 
the first, Public Employee Retirement System of Ohio v. 
Butts, 109 S.Ct. 2854 (1989), the respondent claimed that a 
requirement that anyone receiving disability benefits be 
under the age of 60 violated the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act. Kennedy writing for the majority, looked to 
the legislative intent of the act. Its purpose was to 
prohibit age as a factor for hiring, firing, and wages and 
salaries. As long as the Ohio retirement plan did not 
deceive the Age Discrimination in Employment Act on its 
fac~, reasoned Kennedy, the insurance, retirement, and 
disability plans were exempt from the prohibitions of the 
A.D.E.A. 
In another case Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 109 
S.Ct. 468 (1988), Kennedy used legislative intent to 
determine that the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
did not have the power to impose retroactive cost 
limitations on reimbursements for Medicare. The plain 
language of the statute giving power to the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services was looked at first, and then as a 
last resort the legislative intent. 
The best example of Kennedy's willingness to sidestep a 
major constitutional issue in favor of a narrow statutory 
issue is Topic v. Circle Reality, 532 F2d. 1273 (9th Cir. 
1976). Kennedy wrote for the majority in this case from the 
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A citizens action 
group brought suit against the reality company for steering 
whites and blacks into separate neighborhoods on the basis 
of race. The citizens group brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 
section 3612. Kennedy held that these people were third 
party complainants because they were not directly effected 
themselves and because they were not home buyers, but 
rather, homeowners. Kennedy admitted that racial steering is 
illegal, but section 3612 is not the proper section to 
"vindicate the rights of third parties". 16 Kennedy 
explained that section 3610 "permits suit by any person who 
claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing 
practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured 
by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to 
occur." 17 The fact that Kennedy distinguished between 
sectio~ 3612 and section 3610 after conceding that racial 
steering is illegal best exemplifies his judicial self­
restraint posture. 
/.-
SUMMARY 
Justice Kennedy clearly maintains a posture of judicial 
self restraint in statutory interpretation. If the code or 
statute is clearly written, or if a subsequent code or 
statute to a previous code or statute clarifies, the plain 
meaning of the exact words will be used to resolve the 
issue. Only in rare instances does he look to legislative 
16 532 F2d. 1275 (9th Cir. 1976). 
17 532 F2d. at 1275. 
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intent. This is in keeping with his overall view of the role 
of judge. The judge should apply the rules or principles and 
not use much judicial discretion. The problem with this mode 
of interpretation is that,"[eJven the most carefully drafted 
legislation has gaps." 18 
18 Richard A. Posner, "What Am 17. A Potted Plant? The Case 
Against Strict Constructionism", The New Republic, 
Sept 28 1987, p. 24. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Since Marbury y MadisQn, the dQctrine Qf judicial 
review has been used tQ judge the cQnstitutiQnality of 
legislatiQn Qr actiQns. Each justice has a view abQut the 
use Qf judicial review. Generally there are three approaches 
tQ cQnstitutiQnal interpretatiQn. 19 They are absQlutism, 
balancing Qf interests, and preferred freedQms. 
Absolutists believe Qnly the words Qf the CQnstitution 
Qr an amendment can be used tQ determine cQnstitutiQnality. 
Other schQlars have referred to them as literalists or 
textualists. 20 These peQPle also use the Qriginal intent of 
the framers tQ help guide their opiniQns. They can be either 
activist Qr restraintist in nature. Justice Black was an 
avid absolutist and an activist on the Warren CQUrt. 21 
Then there are those whQ when faced with a 
cQnstitutional question balance the interests of the 
gQvernment against the interests Qf the individual. These 
jurists are said tQ be interest balancers. 22 Interest 
balancers feel that, "although they have accepted the 
premise that the CQurts are political institutiQns, they 
19 Craig Ducat, and Harold W. Chase, ConstitutiQnal 
InterpretatiQn (St. Paul, Minn: West Pub CQ., 
1988), p. 57. 
20 Cole. Constitutional InterpretatiQn: A Bicentennial 
ReflectiQn. 18 CUMB. L. REV. 13 (1987/1988). 
21 Ducat, CQnstitutiQnal InterpretatiQn, p. 57. 
22 !hid., p. 61. 
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feel bound by the fundamental assumption that public policy 
ought to be expressed through the actions of elected 
officials." 23 These judges, therefore, take a self­
restraintist position. 24 
Preferred freedoms is a third approach to 
constitutional interpretation. Jurists following this 
approach believe that some rights are fundamental to a 
democratic system of government. These people take into 
account that there are permanent and unprotected minorities, 
that the Constitution needs to be flexible to deal with an 
ever changing world, and that the interests of the 
individual always come before the government unless the 
government can prove otherwise. 25 This position is clearly 
activist. "Precisely because the Court is not a majoritarian 
institution, it has a constitutional responsibility to 
carefully scrutinize majority passed legislation that 
directly impinges upon the exercise of those rights by 
minorities through which their political demands can be 
expressed." 26 
If a justice of the Supreme Court has an ideology that 
he/she is comfortable with it may run contrary to an 
existing doctrine or precedent. For example, a justice who 
is an absolutist, and who sees the establishment clause of 
the first amendment merely as a prohibition against 
23 .I.b.id. 
24 .I.b.id. 
25 .I.b.id., p. 67. 
26 .I.b.id. 
14
 
governmentally established state religion will run head on 
into opinions that see the establishment clause as a barrier 
to any governmental contact with any religion. Justices with 
differing views of jurisprudence have effected many judicial 
doctrines and legal concepts by expressing these views in 
their opinions. Justices are, however, bound by stare 
decisis. This to some extent, determines how a case should 
be decided. 
Although Justice Kennedy sees himself as a literalist 
and the role of judge as a self-restraintist, his opinions 
are those of a judge who balances interests. At first it may 
seem odd, but one has to look at the precedent with which he 
has to work. The Warren court was more activist in nature 
than the court on which he now sits appears to be. Kennedy 
has to work within the existing legal norms, but he can 
distinguish cases from one another, or he can, for example, 
find compelling government interests to regulate activity 
not previously regulated. This clearly explains the 
difference between the speeches he has given about his 
judicial philosophy and some of his actual opinions. 
HIS OWN VIEWS 
"The first critical assumption (of judicial 
absolutists) is that the Constitution is a collection of 
rules." 27 In 1987 a legal newspaper ran two articles which 
were essentially speeches that Kennedy had given about his 
27 llUd., p. 57. 
15 
view of jurisprudence sometime before his appointment to the 
Supreme Court. In the first article entitled "Wise 
Restraint,s Make Us Free", Justice Kennedy explained, "( t )he 
whole idea of a written Constitution is that there must be 
some fixed principles, some immutable laws, some constraints 
that apply from one generation to the next .... And therefore 
it"s necessary to develop a theory of constitutional 
interpretation that respects that intention and that 
confines the judiciary." 28 In another article published 
• 
about a month later Kennedy said, "To recognize the 
necessity of continued interpretation does not give us a 
license to interpret the document for utilitarian 
ends .... The Constitution cannot be divorced from its logic 
and its language, the intention of its framers, the 
precedents of the law, and the historic values of our 
people." 29 Kennedy feels that, " ... (T)he actual text can 
settle more cases than its given credit for." 30 He goes on 
to say that if the answer is not within the actual text then 
the original intent of the Framers needs to be used. 31 In 
addition to being a literalist, Kennedy is a conservative. 
Kennedy is a judicial conservative who respects 
precedent and the dangers of pursuing abstract philosophical 
agendas. 32 Kennedy himself stated, "It"s a fundamental 
28 "Judge Kennedy: "Wise Restraints Make Us Free," Legal 
Times, 16 Nov., 1987, p. 14. 
29 "Change But Not For The Sake of Change," Legal Times, 
7 Dec., 1987, p. 21. 
30 lh1.d. 
31 lh1.d, 
32 Peter Schrang, "'Webster" Could Answer Many Questions 
16
 
misconception, though, to say that conservatives oppose 
change. To the contrary, conservatives have an acute 
awareness of the necessity for change. They simply do not 
embrace it for its· own sake." 33 The absolutist approach can 
be either activist or restraintist in nature; therefore it 
is important to note Kennedy's conservative political 
position. It is the reason Kennedy articulates in his 
speeches that he chooses the restraintist absolutist 
position, 
A review of his opinions, however, seem not to be 
literalist at all. In fact, they seem to be balancing the 
interests of the government versus the interests of the 
individual. The exception appears to be his concurring 
opinion in Texas V, Johnson, 109 S,Ct, 2533 (1989). Because 
the balancing of interests approach is a self-restraintist 
position, he is comfortable with this approach when the 
absolutist position cannot be used. 
Decisions 
Kennedy's most striking examples of this balancing 
approach is in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 
109 S.Ct. 1402 (1989) and National Treasury Employees Union 
v. Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. 1354 (1989). The Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executiyes Ass'n opinion authorizes the Federal 
Railroad Administration to mandatorally test employees for 
About Kennedy," Los Angeles Daily Journal, 28 Ap., 
1989, p. 4. 
33 "Change", p. 21. 
--------
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drug use under specified serious accidents or safety 
violations. Justice Kennedy explains that although drug 
testing through blood samples and urine tests is a "search" 
under the fourth amendment, the government agents conducting 
the testing do not need probable cause, nor do they need a 
sear'ch war'rant. Kennedy reasoned, "For the Fourth Amendment 
does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those 
that are unreasonable." 34 Rule "G" that had allowed workers 
to identify possible dr'ug use and abuse did very little to 
eradicate the problems created by drug use in the railroad 
industry; ther'efore, the gover'nment had enough of a 
compelling interest in regulating the railr'oads for the 
safety of all those involved, according to the Court. The 
government in these circumstances can use the threat of drug 
testing as a deterrent to future drug use in the industry. 
This case was decided along with another mandatory drug 
testing case. 
In National Treasur'Y Employees Union y. Von Raab, 
D.E.A. agents ar'e automatically tested for drug use when 
they are promoted to positions that deal directly with . 
interdiction of illegal drug trafficking, or that require 
agents to carry firearms within the Drug Enforcement Agency. 
The compelling interest of the gover'nment to fight the drug 
war far out weighed the interests of the individuals. 
(w)hen a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves 
special governmental needs, beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance 
34 109 S.Ct. at 1414. 
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the individual's privacy expectations against the 
government's interests to determine whether it is 
impractical to require a warrant or some level of 
individualized suspicion in the particular 
context. 35 
There is no need for a showing that there be a history of 
drug use by the agents; it is enough that they work in 
sensitive areas of drug enforcement. 
Kennedy, in three cases that questioned criminal 
procedure, ruled in favor of the government. The petitioner 
in Bank of Nova Scotia v. U.S., 108 S.Ct. 2369 (1988), 
claimed the district court had erred when it threw out grand 
jury indictments on the grounds that the rules of federal 
procedure were violated causing the defendants a harmful and 
prejudiced effect in the grand jury proceedings. Kennedy 
agreed that the district court had erred because the rules 
that were violated were not substantial enough to harm or 
prejudice the grand jury. In another case, U.S. v. Broce, 
109 S.Ct. 757 (1989), the respondents pleaded guilty to two 
counts of conspiracy, and subsequently were found guilty. 
They contended that the conviction should be set aside 
because in fact it was one incident of conspiracy; 
therefore, the double count violated guarantees against 
double jeopardy. Kennedy allowed the conviction to stand 
because they admitted their guilt to two crimes in a 
confession to police, and because they pleaded guilty to two 
counts of conspiracy. Kennedy wrote on another double 
jeopardy case from Missouri, Jones v. Thomas, 109 S.Ct. 2522 
35 109 S.Ct. at 1390. 
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(1989). Tpe petitioner was sentenced for two felonies as a 
result of one crime; however, under Missouri law a defendant 
can only be sentenced for one. The governor commuted the 
lesser sentence and the time already served was subtracted 
from the existing sentence. The petitioner filed for a ~ 
of habeas corpus. Kennedy held that because the error was 
realized, and because time was subtracted from the existing 
sentence, there was no showing of a double jeopardy 
violation. 
In a dissenting opinion with Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Kennedy distinguishes Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093 
(1988) from the Miranda'ruling. Kennedy reasoned that if a 
suspect is read his Miranda rights and refuses to talk to 
police until his lawyer is present and a second 
investigation from a different crime brings police to 
question the suspect while in police custody, he must again 
waive his right to talk until his lawyer is present. In 
other words, all questioning for any crime is not halted 
when a suspect invokes his Miranda rights, only the 
questioning for the crime for which his Miranda rights were 
read. "Allowing authorities who conduct a separate 
investigation to read the suspect his Miranda rights and ask 
him wether he wishes to invoke them strikes an appropriate 
balance, which protects the suspect"s freedom from coercion 
without unnecessarily disrupting legitimate law enforcement 
efforts." 36 The author of a Laa Ange 1es Dal IV .Journal 
36 108 S.Ct. at 2103. 
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article expressed, "Kennedy's Roberson dissent with 
Rehnquist manifests a disposition to overrule Miranda, and a 
readiness to abandon 'plain meaning' interpretation when 
" 'C',:,,'such"interpretation ,runs counter to strongly held policy 
references." 37 This opinion partly overstated Kennedy's 
dissent in this case. Kennedy refused to extend Miranda 
beyond its original scope by distinguishing it from other 
cases, rather than a disposition to overrule it all 
together. This was in keeping with Kennedy's self­
restraintist position to refuse to extend the facts of one 
case beyond those of the original case. "The technique of 
restricting a precedent to a narrow range enables a judge to 
depart, in a sense, from prior rulings without defying or 
... overturning them." 38 Kennedy was clearly interested in 
protecting the individuals interests which would not lead to 
a conclusion that he is willing to overrule Miranda all 
together. 
Two opinions from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit also exhibit Kennedy's balancing of interest 
approach. In Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F2d. 788 (9th Cir. 
1980), former sailors brought suit alleging that the Navy's 
regulation which allows the dismissing of persons who admit 
to homosexual activity violated the due process clause of 
37 Louis B Scwartz,"Kennedy: The Newest Justice stakes His 
Position: The 'Gray Market' Case, 'Plain Meaning', and 
Other Portents," Los Angeles Daily Journal, 30 Sept., 
1988, p. 5. 
38 Martin P Golding, Lega] Reasoning (New York NY: 
Alfred A Knopf, 1984), p. 101. 
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the Fifth Amendment. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. He 
explained that the dismissals did not violate the fifth 
amendment protection: 
. :. ,., ' ; 
'""" """'We"are"limited"to"determining whether or not the 
Constitution prohibits the Navy from adopting the 
rule before us. We cannot say that constitutional 
limitations have been exceeded here, and 
therefore h we do not find the regulation is invalid . .::l9 
Kennedy refused to come to a conclusion of whether 
homosexual activity is a fundamental right of privacy. "We 
decide at the outset that this case does not require us to 
address the question whether consensual private homosexual 
conduct is a fundamental right .... " 40 Kennedy, like in the 
Arizona y. Roberson dissent, applied the principle of stare 
decisis. Kennedy explained, 
Recent decisions indicate that substantive due 
process scrutiny of a government regulation 
involves a case-by-case balancing of the nature of 
the individual interest allegedly infringed, the 
importance of the government interests furthered, 
the degree of infringement, and the sensitivity of 
the government entity responsible for the 
regulation to more carefully tailored alternative 
means of achieving its goals. 41 
Kennedy finally held: 
We conclude, in these cases, that the importance 
of the government interests furthered, and to some 
extent the relative impracticality at this time of 
achieving the Government' s goals by regulations 
which turn more precisely on the facts of an 
individual case, outweigh whatever heightened 
solicitude is appropriate for consensual private 
homosexual conduct. 42 
39 632 F2d. at 792. 
40 632 F2d. at 807. 
41 l.b.i.d. 
42 l.b.i.d. 
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Kennedy felt that the fact that it was the Navy which was 
the employer in this case was crucial to his decision 
because he wrote, ': ... that some kinds of governmental 
~ . .'.-;... .. ..' . 
regulation of private consensual homosexual behavior may 
(emphasis added) face substantial constitutional 
challenge."43 . 
Another example of the balancing of interests approach 
is apparent in a case from the court of appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit involving pay differences between jobs held by 
men and women within the Washington state governnlent. In 
addition to the words of the law, Kennedy looked to 
legislative intent as well to help decide the case. The 
American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees 
brought suit against the state of Washington in AFSCME v. 
State of Washington, 770 F2d. 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). It 
alleged that Washington paid its women workers less for jobs 
of comparable worth to men in violation of Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act. Kennedy held that 
While the Washington legislature may have the 
discretion to enact a comparable worth plan if it 
chooses to do so, Title VII does not obligate it 
to eliminate an economic inequality it did not 
create .... We find nothing in the language of Title 
VII or its legislative history to indicate 
Congress intended to abrogate fundamental economic 
principles such as the laws of supply and demand 
or to prevent employers from competing in the 
labor market. 44 
While Kennedy was on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, he wrote an insightful case demonstrating his 
43 lhid. 
44 770 F2d. at 1407. 
--
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literalist approach to jurisprudence. In 1980, a case came 
before the Court of Appeals concerning a congressional veto 
over ruling an Immigration and Naturalization Service 
,'.,.. ,"; " -
.', .. '.... . ....' .' 
finding. In Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 634 F2d. 408 (9th Cir. 1980), Kennedy held that 
statute unconstitutional. The statute gave Congress a one­
house legislative veto over ruling an agency finding. The 
veto violated the doctrine of separation of powers 
established by the Constitution, because the INS is 
essentially an agency of the executive branch. Kennedy 
wrote, the veto is an " assUmption of power ... both 
disruptive and unnecessary to the attainment of a legitimate 
purpose." 45 Kennedy feels very strongly that each branch of 
government stay with in its constitutional mandate. This 
opinion falls with in his literalist approach toward 
constitutional interpretation. The concurring opinion 
written for the controversial flag burning case, Texas v. 
Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1988), also exhibits this position. 
For we are presented with a clear and simple 
statute to be judged against a pure command of the 
Constitution .... The hard fact is that sometimes we 
must make decisions we do not like. We make them 
because they are right, right in the sense that 
the law and the Constitution, as we see them, 
compel the result ....With all respect to those 
views, (of Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices White 
and O'Connor dissenting) I do not believe the 
Constitution gives us the right to rule as the 
dissenting members of the Court urge, however this 
judgement is to announce .... the fact remains that 
45 634 F2d. at 409. 
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his acts were speech, in both the technical and 
the fundamental meaning of the Constitution. 46 
In a somewhat different but related vain, Thomas Grey in a 
1975 law review article articulated the sentiments written 
by Kennedy in his concurring opinion . 
.......•. ,...• '.. ,,' : ,•. "::,i.,:.,." .! :
 " ..•..•' '''''':''';''(W'jhen'' the-·cQurt'"etrikes·· down' a:'popular statute 
or practice as unconstitutional, it may always 
reply to the resulting public outcry: 'We didn't 
do it you did.' The people have chosen the 
principles that the statute or practice violated, 
have designated it as fundamental, and have 
written it down in the text of the Constitution 
for the judges to interpret and apply.47 
Justice Kennedy said just that to the other members of the 
Court, and to that part of the public that is offended by 
flag burning. 
SUMMARY 
Many Supreme Court watchers speculated that Kennedy 
would be a middle-of-the-road justice. This could not be 
more untrue. Today as well as his past years on the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Justice Kennedy is not a 
middle-of-the-road justice. When he can, he is an 
absolutist. Often, though, the Court has in preceding 
decisions established a framework within which he must work. 
When those cases arise, Kennedy will balance the interests 
in a position of self-restraint most comfortable to him.·One 
author wrote that although justices actin a self­
restraintist manor their acts may actually be activist in 
46 109 S.Ct. at 2548.
 
47 Grey. Do We Haye an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L.
 
REV. 705 (1975). 
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nature. 48 This is precisely what Justice Kennedy's opinions 
during his initial tenure appear to do. He takes the 
restraintist position to achieve activist ends, Whether he 
actually wants to achieve activist ends with his restaintist 
research. 
48 Ely. Constitutional Interpretiyism:Its Allure 
and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1977/1978). 
----------
, '" ,., .. ',.' .' 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Some the works of Anthony M. Kennedy have been used to 
analyze his decisions, and the conclusions drawn here are 
not the same as those offered by some journalists and 
... , 
':'scholars';" Many of these authorities thought they knew his 
behavior, but they did not. The first such article was 
published in December 1987. It explained that unlike Bork, 
Kennedy appeared to be a middle-of-the-road judge. "In less 
strident tones, he declared that he has no fixed views on 
abortion, the limitations on privacy rights, or the death 
penalty, and he described hiB growing sensitivity to race 
and gender discrimination." 49 Charles Williams stated, 
'" despite having written more than 430 opinions 
during his 12 years on the 9th Circuit, and 
despite having undergone questioning by the same 
Senate Judiciary Committee that meticulously 
dissected Bork, no one knows how a Justice Kennedy 
would treat the most sensitive issues of our day: 
civil rights, women"s rights and the right to 
privacy. 50 
A year and a half later, however, journalists and scholars 
seem to backing away from their earlier position. 
A year later seasoned courtwatchers say Supreme 
Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy is still far 
from a judicial certainty. But, he appears to have 
aligned himself firmly with the Courts more 
conservative justices, bringing the high court its 
first working conservative majority in decades. 51 
49 Charles Roberts, "Kennedy Promises Law And Order As 
Hearings Begin: High Court Nominee Says No Fixed Views 
On Abortion, Privacy: Polite Give And Take," LQ.a 
Angeles Daily Journal, 15 Dec., 1987, p. 1. 
50 Williams, " The Opinions of Anthony Kennedy," p. 56. 
51 Richard A Reuben, " After One Year Kennedy Still 
A Mystery Man: Seems To Side With Conservative Wing, 
But Still Very Early: Liberals Hopeful," LQ.a 
Angeles Daily Journal, 7 Ap., 1989, p. 1. 
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Kennedy is clearly a conservative justice who will in 
most instances go the conservative route. There will be 
fewer sweeping cases like Brown v Board or Miranda v' 
Arizona giving citizens rights they did not know they had, 
:'...-::,«, "''''''''''':;'but' fn'l;i'Yiil'i('t"o' riei'tdct' 'ail"ch'decii3i6b'~,the'Court,'thanks 
to Justice Kennedy, may be more activist than it has been in 
years. 
Kennedy said he felt proud that his name will appear 
on the same water goblet as Justice Powell and Justice 
Black. 52 A scholar, in a soon to be published article, 
interpreted that statement. "He was impressed that his water 
goblet is the, same used by a favorite former justice, Hugo 
Black,53 One author wrote of Justice Black: 
Throughout his long and remarkable career on the 
bench, the most consistently reiterated theme of 
his constitutional jurisprudence was the need for 
fidelity to the constitutional text in judicial 
review, and the illegitimacy of constitutional 
doctrines based on sources other that the explicit 
commands of the written Constitution. 54 
This perception of jurisprudence is plainly articulated 
in Kennedy's own speeches outlining his jurisprudence. He 
stated that he prefers the "textual approach" in cases 
involving constitutional and statutory interpretation 
52 24 The Docet Sheet of The Supreme Court of the United 
States, Winter 1988, at 1, col. 1 
53 Melone, "Revisiting the Freshman Effect Hypothesis: The 
First Two Terms of Justice Anthony Kennedy," 
(Paper submitted to American Judicature Society, Spring 
1990) . 
54 Grey, Do We Have, p. 703. 
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cases. 55 The only real difference from what Kennedy has 
said and from what was written about Black is that Kennedy 
will use the absolutist aPproach in a restraintist rather 
than activist manor. As Kennedy feels more at home in the 
",':'"."", ""':"'SUp"i';';m~"'t<;uj;"t'thamber8more""de:6ieii6ns lik'eTOPIC and Chadha ; 
which demonstrate most clearly a literalist approach to 
jurisprudence may be handed down. 
55 "Wise Restraints," p. 4. 
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